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CHAPTER NINE 
ARE WE ‘LAZY GREEKS’ OR ‘NAZI GERMANS’? NEGOTIATING INTERNATIONAL HIERARCHIES 
IN THE EURO CRISIS1 
 
Rebecca Adler-Nissen - University of Copenhagen 
 
Forthcoming in Ayse Zarakol (ed) Hierarchies in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016). 
 
This chapter argues that to understand international hierarchies, we need to examine not only the 
type of hierarchy, but also processes of internalization of – and resistance to – hierarchies. We will 
then discover that many hierarchies are not simply imposed from above, but that subordinate actors 
are often complicit in the ongoing production and negotiation of hierarchies. I begin this argument 
with the simple observation that some international hierarchies are taken for granted. Today, it 
seems obvious that there is a hierarchy in the Eurozone with Germany at the top and Greece at the 
bottom. Scholars, politicians and media see Germany as the leader and economic power-house of 
Europe, while Greece is represented as ‘bankrupt’ and ‘dysfunctional’ with high levels of 
unemployment. What we often overlook, however, is that it was not inevitable that these particular 
countries would occupy these positions in the hierarchy. Why Greece and not Italy, Spain or 
Ireland? We cannot explain why Greece became the poster boy for the Eurozone crisis based purely 
on its economic troubles – because Spain and Italy share similar debt problems as Greece and are 
just as closely monitored and subordinated to the austerity measures imposed by the IMF, the EU 
                                                            
1 Research for this article was carried out as part of the project on ‘Images and International Security’, directed by Lene 
Hansen and funded by the Danish Council for Independent Research — Social Sciences, Grant number DFF 
— 1327-00056B and the project ‘DIPLOFACE’ funded by the European Research Council Starting Grant  - grant number 
680102. I am grateful to Cleio Katsivela and Johan Spanner for research assistance with the data collection. I wish to 
thank Ayse Zarakol, David Lake and Neil Dooley for excellent and detailed suggestions and thanks to all the 
contributors to this volume for their stimulating comments in San Diego and Cambridge. 
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and international lenders.2 Likewise, while the German economy has been doing relatively well, it 
suffers from structural problems, including a growing number of working poor.3 
The euro crisis has pushed national leaders to adopt policies and deepen European integration in 
ways that they would not otherwise have done.4 Why? Economic scholarship has largely adopted 
what Ayse Zarakol calls an agentic/institutional understanding of hierarchy, focusing on the causes 
of the global financial crisis or the flaws in the architecture of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU).5 The problem becomes one of institutional design needing adjustment. In contrast, scholars 
in international political economy, sociology and anthropology have adopted a structural 
understanding of hierarchy, arguing that the euro crisis cannot be understood by economics and the 
institutional setup of the EMU alone. They have addressed the way in which the crisis is also 
ideologically constructed, focusing on the dominance of monetarism, ordo-liberalism and a 
particular idea of austerity.6 Along these lines, scholars such as Fourcade, Antoniades and Hertzfeld 
have analyzed the stigmatization of Greece and the other ‘PIGS’ (the derogatory term refers to the 
economies of Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain, sometimes Italy is also included, leading to the 
acronym PIIGS).9  It has even been demonstrated that the repetition of the acronym ’PIIGS’ in 
public debates shaped the behavior of market actors toward these countries, such that increased 
media usage of the term ‘PIIGS’ was followed by increased changes in Irish bond yields.10  
However, a focus on the character of the hierarchy – be it agentic/institutional or structural – 
only brings us some way in explaining the relative positions of Greece and Germany. In this 
chapter, I adopt a broad view of hierarchy, focusing on the interplay of mediatized discourses in the 
                                                            
2 Dooley 2014; Tzogopoulos 2013. 
3 Grahl and Teague 2013. 
4 Zarakol, this volume; Beach 2014; Tzogopoulos 2013; Rosato 2011; Schimmelfennig 2015. 
5 Soros 2012; Pisani-Ferry 2012; De Grauwe 2013. 
6 Rynner 2011; Blyth 2013. 
9 Hertzfeld 2013; Antoniades 2012; Fourcade 2013. 
10 Brazys & Hardiman 2015. 
 3	
Eurozone, but contrary to a structuralist approach, I suggest that the ranking of states is an 
interactive, not unidirectional process, leaving more room for agency within international hierarchies. 
Self-labelling, including low self-esteem and anxiety about national status, is just as important (if not 
more important) than discourse emerging from top positions in the hierarchy. In other words, the 
euro crisis gains its public meaning through interactive dynamics that rank states by labeling them. 
It is the public naming and shaming in national and pan-European debates that not only construct, 
sustain and destabilize particular national stereotypes, but, as I will show, also shape a self-reflexive 
struggle over hierarchy in Europe. Both Greek and German public debates are deeply concerned 
with how ‘the others’ views ‘us’.  
This first part of the chapter explores why hierarchy appears awkward in multilateral institutions 
emphasizing sovereign equality. It shows how hierarchies are produced, upheld and challenged 
through stigmatizing and stereotyping labels. The second part of the chapter presents a survey of 
how German and Greek newspapers label – and thereby also rank Germany and Greece – and 
react to the way in which their countries are ranked themselves in a period of three months during 
the height of the euro crisis. The labels include Germany as ‘Nazi oppressor and colonizer’, ‘strict 
teacher’ and ‘naïve victim’ and Greece as ‘colonized and oppressed – and possible neo-Nazi 
resistant’, ‘immature pupil’ and ‘moral sinner’. Each label positions the state very differently. Based 
on an in-depth analysis and contextualization of the stereotyping of self and other, the chapter 
suggests that rather than merely consolidating Germany’s (and Northern Europe’s) economic and 
political superiority and sustaining the subordination of Greece (and other Southern states); the euro 
crisis generates a series of more complex, self-reflective national debates and political gestures of 
repair and embarrassment. These dynamics reveal a deep concern in both Greece and Germany 
about how they are perceived on the international scene. The chapter concludes with reflections on 
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how international status struggles are more interactive and self-reflective than usually assumed, 
suggesting different ways in which hierarchies may change from within. 
 
Interactive labeling and the production of international hierarchy  
This section develops two theoretical claims about hierarchy in international relations. First, I 
suggest that that the norm of sovereign equality, which helps legitimize multilateral cooperation, 
requires a concealment of international hierarchy. Second, I propose that international hierarchies 
are produced through interactive processes of self- and other-labeling where subordinate states 
contribute to their own subordination. 
 
Hierarchy in a world of sovereign equality 
Hierarchy comes from the Greek hierarchia (ἱεραρχία), which means ‘leader of sacred rites’ – or 
‘sacred sovereignty’.11 It is an arrangement of items (objects, names, values, categories, etc.) in which 
the items are represented as being ‘above’, ‘below’, or ‘at the same level as’ one another. We find 
social hierarchies in all societies, but hierarchy clashes with most assumptions about international 
anarchy that have dominated realist and much of liberal IR theory.12 Yet, the important 
observation for this chapter is that if hierarchy is about stratification, its logical opposite must be 
equality rather than anarchy. This is important for IR theory because of the assumption that 
sovereign states are formally equal under international law irrespective of their military power, 
economic size etc.13 For the same reason, hierarchy is also awkward for the functioning of 
multilateralism, including the European Union, which gives its members – large and small – a 
                                                            
11 Grint 2013, 90. 
12 For a discussion, see Zarakol, this volume; Donnely, this volume. 
13 See Reus-Smit 2005. Sovereign equality was formally recognized as the basis of diplomacy and international law at 
the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815). See Osiander 2011. 
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promise of sovereign equality.14 The principle of sovereign equality is written into the EU’s treaties 
and is reflected in the rights and privileges that all member states enjoy. In principle, this makes it 
possible for the Danish Prime Minister to have just as much voice in the nomination of a new 
European Council President as the French President during a European Council Meeting. Also the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is attached to sovereign equality. All members of the 
Eurozone sit on the board of the European Central Bank and have equal voting rights.15 Yet, 
although sovereignty is a marker of equal status in multilateral fora, it does not put all states in a 
level playing field. The difference in voting weights between big and small EU member states 
suggests that some states are more equal than others.16 
Yet, even a closer look at the distributions of formal rights and privileges in the Eurozone, i.e. the 
institutional form of hierarchy, tell us little about how hierarchies actually play out. The degree to 
which ‘objective’ systems of measurement of power (such as voting weights or length of 
membership) feed into the negotiation of the euro crisis depends on different labels that are attached 
discursively to the different member states. Perceptions of relative status flow from the ways in 
which nations define themselves and are defined by their place in the international pecking order.17 
This symbolic and mediated struggle affects the relative positions of states.   
 
Social labels as markers of hierarchy  
                                                            
14 This promise is historically contingent: before state sovereignty was established as a universal principle, polities could 
not (and did not) necessary expect to be treated as equal. There were great formal differences in status, rights and 
privileges between for instance, colonies, protectorates and free cities and empires. See e.g. Nexon 1999; Nexon & 
Wright 2007; Krasner 1999.  
15 On 1 January 1999, the third and final stage of EMU commenced with the fixing of the exchange rates of the 
currencies of the 11 member states initially participating in monetary union, and with a single monetary policy under the 
responsibility of the European Central Bank. It was not until German unification that a European Monetary Union 
became politically possible. During the Maastricht Treaty negotiations in 1991–1992, Germany sacrificed its strong 
Deutschmark for a common European currency and was allowed unification (Berger 1997: 57).  
16 The practical experience of statehood can differ dramatically, but sovereign equality remains a guiding principle for 
how states talk to each other in diplomatic relations (Adler-Nissen & Gad eds. 2013). 
17 Pouliot 2011; Pouliot 2016. 
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How do we know hierarchy when we see it? IR scholars have adopted insights from sociology, 
particularly from Norbert Elias and Erving Goffman, to show how stigmatization plays a crucial 
function in international relations by shaming states, displaying normality and clarifying the 
boundaries of acceptable behavior.18 This literature suggests that labels single out particular socially 
constructed attributes, whether related to religion, geography, race, gender, class or language or 
something else.19 These attributes are used to homogenize the nation discursively. Sometimes the 
label in question connotes that a particular state has or is assumed to have a presumed positive or 
negative attribute of some kind – a superior quality or a ‘handicap’ or perceived cultural, social or 
racial difference. For instance, labels such as ‘Europeanization’20 or ‘gender equality’21 locate states 
in international hierarchies. Stigmatizing labels’ negative connotations become manifested in 
discriminatory practices that in turn designate the nation’s status in international society. In world 
politics, labeling is often directly linked to the distribution of resources and opportunities. For 
example, the Corruption Perception Index, which orders the countries of the world according to the 
degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians, has an impact 
on the allocation of development aid to many countries. While the index, provided annually by the 
international NGO Transparency International, has been criticized for reducing the complex 
political and economic challenges facing a state to problems of corruption, it provides an efficient 
means of rating states according to one feature.22 
International hierarchies are often moral ordering tools. They help decide when a state is ‘guilty’ 
or ‘innocent’, when it has to pay for war crimes, when it can be sanctioned and when it is allowed to 
defend itself. After World War II, Germany and Japan were occupied by the Allies and were 
                                                            
18 Zarakol 2011; Adler-Nissen 2014. 
19 See Lippmann, for one of the first analyses of the importance of stereotypes for public opinion (Lippmann, 1922). 
20 Rumelili 2003, 2004. 
21 Towns 2012. 
22 Lancaster & Montinola 1997. 
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punished not just as military, but also as moral losers.23 Such processes involve an interstate 
dramaturgy that produces, upholds and challenge hierarchy. By their very political and social usage, 
stigmatizing labels confirm the existence of distinctions between full rights and rights as social 
privileges extend to certain groups and denied to others. Thus, labels become part of the struggle of 
both the ‘higher’ and the ‘lower’ nations alike. When it comes to economic transactions and debt, 
hierarchies are often naturalized on the state level so that the moral worth of a state – and resultant 
moral ordering of states – is simply taken to be a direct reflection of its sovereign debt.24 As 
Fourcade puts it ’economy is always and everywhere a morality play, where actors – individuals, 
corporations, countries – are apprehended not only through numbers, formulas and charts aiming 
at precision, but also through rather coarse moral categories of virtue and vice, good and bad, high 
and low’.25 
Hierarchies in international relations depend on constant recognition by both those that are 
above and below in ranking. As Subotic and Zarakol explain, states’ ‘sense of self’ or cultural 
intimacy may be linked to sense of shame, guilt or embarrassment rather than positive traits or 
characteristics.26 In other words, states’ international positions are not just a result of their struggle 
for a better status vis-à-vis other states as Social Identity Theory27 would have it, but also a result of 
their dealings with their own past and domestic conflicts (which again are shaped by the outside 
world). This does not mean that hierarchies are legitimate or accepted by everyone – often they are 
not. But in struggling to manage their international status, states sometimes end up reproducing 
their own subordination.  
 
                                                            
23 Buruma 1994; Zarakol 2011; Adler-Nissen 2014. 
24 Fourcade 2013: 622; Dooley 2014. 
25 Fourcade 2013, 262. 
26 Subotic and Zarakol 2012. 
27 Larson and Shevchenko 2010. 
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Negotiating hierarchies in Europe 
Many Europeans have held exaggerated beliefs about how ‘entering Europe’ would impact on the 
relative status of their nation. As Giurlando shows, Italy’s entry into the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) in 1999 is an example of this. Italy (as all EU members) had to make many sacrifices 
to enter the EMU, and to build support for these sacrifices, Italian political leaders explained that 
EMU membership would mean that Italy would rise in status.28 Even before the euro crisis, the 
adoption of the particular path of economic reform and the construction of EU-level governance 
helped rank EU member states. Examining Italian newspapers from 1996-2004, Giurlando shows 
that even though Italy was one of the founders of the EU, adopting the euro was framed as 
something that would solve Italy’s marginalization in Europe, as Italians had continued to identify 
themselves and were identified by others as a ‘second tier’ country compared to Germany, France 
and the UK. Italians understood EMU membership as a chance to allow external forces to re-shape 
them as ‘modern’ and ‘mature’ Europeans.  
Giurlando argues that this constant comparison with other member states is a form of ‘associative 
evaluation’ revealing a ‘perceived hierarchy’ in Europe.29 Associative evaluation helps explain the 
hopes and aspirations in Italian support for the euro. Therefore, when Italy joined the Eurozone 
there was a widespread sense that the country had indeed entered the league of European elite 
countries. Later, following the euro crisis, populist discourses developed, leading to what some 
observers see as an emerging ‘intra-European neo-racism’30 and neo-colonial politics,31 which 
                                                            
28 Guirlando 2012. 
29 Giurlando 2012. 
30 Kouvélakis 2012, xix, see also Andreou 2012. 
31 Vosolle 2014. 
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discursively infantislises the periphery in Europe.32 The correction of ‘PIIG’ immaturity has been 
viewed as a ‘civilizing mission’, a paternalistic eurocentrism directed within Europe itself.33  
However, contrary to a structualist understanding of hierarchy, this dominant civilizing narrative 
and its resultant ranking of states was not the logical result of inevitable pressures that dictated 
austerity as the only answer to the euro crisis. As Matthijs and McNamara convincingly show, the 
response to the crisis that arose out of public and economic debates, privileged certain definitions 
and solutions over others.34 Austerity and structural reform became the respective cures for member 
states’ national problems of ‘fiscal profligacy’ and ‘lack of competitiveness’ over more federal 
diagnoses.35 Swift implementation of those policies, the argument went, would produce both fiscal 
discipline and labor market flexibility, and the crisis would gradually go away.36 Yet this winning 
narrative and subsequent set of policy prescriptions are puzzling since they did not fit the situation 
in Ireland, Portugal and Spain and only partly did the ‘fiscal sin’ logic materialize in Greece. 
‘Plausible systemic counter-narratives of what went wrong’37 included the Eurozone’s lack for 
supporting economic governance institutions, or the pressures of persistent trade and financial 
imbalances, yet neither of those would end up driving the debate, nor the solutions offered. How did 
the disciplining austerity narrative become dominant? 
The most convincing answer so far is that the ‘myriad explanatory narratives of the Eurozone 
debt crisis’ emerged in a split between a EU- and a national-level account.38 Both EU-level 
narratives and national-level narratives reflected largely an institutional approach to hierarchy. EU-
level accounts of the euro crisis pointed to the euro’s flawed institutional design at Maastricht in 
                                                            
32 O’Neil 2014; Marder 2012. 
33 Marder 2012. 
34 Matthijs and McNamara 2015. 
35 Matthijs and McNamara 2015, 235. 
36 Matthijs & Blyth 2015. 
37 Matthijs and McNamara 2015, 230. 
38 Matthijs and McNamara 2015, 235. 
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1991 and the many missing unions (economic, fiscal, political, financial, debate and banking) that 
were never constructed.39 National-level accounts, on the other hand, focused on failings within the 
individual member states, and thereby turned the euro crisis narrative into a ‘morality tale’ of 
Northern ‘saints’ and Southern ‘sinners’.40 As Matthijs and McNamara write, ‘Hard work, prudent 
savings, moderate consumption, wage restraint, and fiscal stability in Germany were seen as 
Northern virtues and were juxtaposed to the Southern vices of low competitiveness, meager savings, 
undeserved consumption, inflated wages and fiscal profligacy in the Mediterranean’.41 The solution 
to the crisis accordingly became one of ‘necessary’ reforms in the periphery. 
The national-level account won. This meant that the sinners needed to start behaving more like 
the saints. If they did, all would be well with the single currency’s future. Instead of rebuilding the 
Eurozone from the top down (with supranational solidarity mechanisms) as the EU-level account 
prescribed, this strategy tried to transform Europe from the bottom up. Arguably, as critics adhering 
to a structural understanding of hierarchy explained, this strategy would force the Eurozone onto a 
path towards some kind of ‘Model Deutschland writ large’, by making wage and price flexibility in the 
periphery into the main shock absorbers during future crises.42 As Matthijs and McNamara explain 
‘German thinkers, opinion writers and policymakers played a pivotal role in making the diagnosis of 
the euro’s ills as well as stipulating its cure, framing and ultimately ‘resolving’ the crisis’ (Matthijs 
and McNamara 2015: 236).  
While a structural understanding of hierarchy in the euro crisis takes some way in accounting for  
the role of public debate and stereotyping, it glosses over important interactive processes and reify 
states. Blyth, Fourcade and others43 point at the homogenization of nations, resulting from the 
                                                            
39 Matthijs and McNamara 2015, 230. 
40 Fourcade 2013. 
41 Matthijs and McNamara 2015: 235. 
42 Matthijs & Blyth 2015, quoted in Matthijs and McNamara 2015, 235. 
43 with Matthijs and McNamara 2015, as an important exemption. 
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moral tales of ‘sinners’ and ‘angels’, but they fall into trap of claiming that ‘Germany’ is doing 
something – or rather that German political leadership is uncontested within or outside Germany. 
Yet to fully understand why a particular narrative about the euro crisis became dominant, and how 
this enabled Greece to be situated at the bottom of the reform agenda, we need to analyze the 
complicity of Greek voices in this debate. We need to look at the self-reflexive and highly interactive 
responses that led to the construction of Germany and Greece as in a hierarchical and antagonistic 
relationship. This requires changing the question from ‘what or who put Greece in this position?’ 
(where Greece becomes a passive victim due to Germany’s domination) to the question: How is the 
hierarchical relationship produced? 
 
Searching for labels of Greece and Germany 
To capture the process that produces hierarchy, we need to investigate not only dominant 
narratives, i.e. hierarchy as a structure, but also how subordinate perceive their own position and 
that of the rest of Europe – and their mutual resonance. With this purpose in mind, publically 
available material within the Germany and Greece was analysed, the two countries that came to 
represent two extreme positions in the euro crisis. To select the periods for data collection, a parallel 
search was done on Google Trends. Google Trends analyzes a percentage of Google web searches 
to determine how many searches have been done for the terms entered compared to the total 
number of Google searches done during that time. A search was done for the country name 
(‘Greece’, ‘Germany’ / ‘Greek*’ and ‘German*’) and the word ‘euro’ (specified as the currency). 
This was done in both Greek and German languages. The search period was limited to January 
2008 to March 2014 to identify peaks on the resulting curves. Correlating peaks in the two countries 
were identified and a selection was made for the largest search peak and a three-month period 
around this peak: April, May and June 2010.  
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Newspapers were selected not by the criteria of top circulation, but with a view to the 
newspapers' agenda-setting qualities and to represent different political views and ways of 
stereotyping in tabloids, broadsheet as well as intellectual newspapers. The aim was to cover as 
broad a spectrum of domestic public opinion and debate as possible. For Germany this resulted in 
the choice of BILD, Germany's largest tabloid, Tageszeitung (TaZ) a Berlin-based intellectual 
newspaper, and Frankfurter Allgemeine - a centre-right broadsheet.  
For Greece, selection of newspapers proved more difficult because the economic crisis has 
dramatically changed the media landscape. Some newspapers have been closed permanently or 
have limited their circulation to Sunday editions, confining to Internet version on weekdays. 
Moreover, new newspapers have appeared as well as a series of online papers, magazines and blogs. 
There is a major difficulty of access to archives. Greek newspaper archives are generally not 
accessible online.44 On this basis, the decision was made to cover four newspapers, two of which 
represent the mainstream - Kathimerini (centre-right) and To Vima (centre-left). Both newspapers are 
highly agenda-setting, especially in their Sunday versions. The other two Greek newspapers are 
Proto Thema, a tabloid style newspaper, (mostly) in circulation on weekends, and Avgi a left-wing 
newspaper, representing mainly the left-wing party Syriza which the has been the main opposition 
party since 2010, a serious challenger of shifting Greek governments and winner of the 2015 general 
election.  
With this selection of German and Greek newspapers, the key patterns in public opinion is 
captured, although the most extremist or populist stances were not covered, which were either 
low in circulation and/or do not have online archives. The types of articles were limited to 
editorials, which were known to shape public opinion and produce labels. Despite the increased 
digitalisation of media, major newspapers editorials continue to influence national and 
                                                            
44 One has to go to each newspaper site and search through that or do a Google search with ‘site:(internet address of 
newspaper) (search words)’ and then limit the search through Google tools. 
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international politics and events, as well as provide insight into social and broader culture issues. 
A search was done with two keywords 'Euro' and 'Griech*' in German editorials and ‘Germany’ 
(and derivatives) and ‘euro’ in Greek editorials. This resulted in a total of 221 editorials of which 
152 were Greek and 69 were German. An open coding process was used, adding labels along the 
way to ensure that all possible labels were included in the analysis. This open coding was 
subsequently reduced to 10 labels. For Germany, this resulted in ‘oppressor’, ‘teacher, ‘victim’, 
‘other’ and ‘none’. For Greece it was ‘cheater’, ‘tragedy’, ‘child/pupil’, ‘patient’ and ‘resister’, 
‘other’ and ‘none’.  Distinction was made between who or what is labeled (‘the other’, ‘oneself’, 
‘both’ or none) and whether the label is positive or negative.  
 
Results 
The survey of the editorials makes it possible to correct the story of ‘sinners’ and ‘saints’ and the 
unidirectional force of hierarchy as a structure. First, labels of nations and nationalities used in the 
Greek and German newspapers refer to different ranking principles with different policy 
implications. Second, German and Greek media produce not only negative, but also positive labels of 
‘the other’. For instance, one Greek editorial in the main Conservative newspaper argues that ‘we 
can learn from the well-tuned and disciplined Germans’. Third, and perhaps most interestingly, 
there is a considerable degree of self-stereotyping or self-blame taking place. 25 pct. of German 
editorials are stereotyping Germans, and the majority of these labels are negative. The number of 
‘pure’ self-stereotyping was significantly lower in Greek newspapers (12 pct.), but 30 pct. of the 
Greek editorials labeled both Germans and Greeks, and over 70 pct. of these were negative or 
mildly negative of Greece, arguing that the crisis is Greece’s own fault (due to mismanagement, an 
intrinsically corrupt political establishment, a spoiled culture etc.).  
Table 1: Labeling ‘other’ and ‘self’ 
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Labels Greek newspapers 
Number/Percentag
e 
German 
newspapers 
Number/Percentag
e 
Other 56            37% 16                23% 
Self 18            12% 17                25% 
Both 44            30%  9                 13% 
None 30            19% 27                39% 
Others/not 
categorized 
 4              2% - 
Total 152 69 
 
This widespread Greek and German self-bashing based on crude generalizations indicates that 
states do not just seek positive identities with a view to maintaining or improving their relative 
positions. Through public debates they also internalize international criticism and develop various 
forms of shame. In fact, as I will demonstrate, there a remarkable degree of interaction and 
responsiveness in the Greek and German debates on the euro crisis and their own role in it. Both 
Greek and German editorials are deeply concerned with how ‘the others’ views ‘us’. Controversial 
depictions of Greeks or Greece in German debates (and of Germans in Greek media) are quickly 
picked up, circulated and widely discussed. This suggests a European – or transnational – dimension 
of a domestic debate about morality and responsibility for the euro crisis. This concern is also 
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apparent in the many blogs by Greek journalists and opinion makers, frustrated with the ways in 
which foreign media display Greek as moral hazard and stereotype all Greek citizens.45 
 The subsequent sections explore how the different labels invoke particular positions in the 
international hierarchy, how they are in dialogue or respond to news outlets in the other member 
states and how these labels suggest different responses to the crisis.  
Table 2: Distribution of labels 
 
 
Dominance: Negotiating the trope of Nazism 
One of the most dramatic performances of hierarchy in the euro crisis is linked to German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel. The Chancellor figures regularly in protests in the streets of Athens 
and Thessaloniki – with fangs dripping with blood and dressed up as the leader of a new Reich. 
The Nazi-version of the German Chancellor was staged first staged in a public protest in Greece 
in the summer of 2011, about the same time that Merkel made two provocative statements: that 
Greece was in need of more permanent ‘supervision’ and that its default could lead to the 
                                                            
45 See for instance ‘Keep Talking, Greece’, http://www.keeptalkinggreece.com. 
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dissolution of the euro and the collapse of European unity.46 In Greek newspapers, no person is 
more identified than Merkel with the punitive measures.47 
 Yet when examining the Greek and German coverage of the trope of Nazism in the three-
month period of 2010, references to the Nazi past turns out to be more complex. Many traits 
that are ascribed to ‘the other’ are traits that the Greek society struggles with domestically. Two 
patterns of labels relating to Nazism can be identified the survey of Greek and German editorials: 
(1) Germany trying to dominate Europe as it did during the Nazi regime, making Greece a 
victim or resistant to German occupation and (2) Greek neo-Nazism as the underdog’s response 
to German hegemony and EU technocracy. 
 
The German oppressor 
Several Greek editorials draw parallels between modern day soup kitchens and the ‘hungry 
country’ under German occupation. More than 500,000 Greeks died between October 1940 and 
October 1944, more than half of that figure is put down to hunger and malnutrition.48 As one 
Greek editorial explains ‘Germany does not pay its war compensations even though courts have 
ruled so, and the German government is politically pressuring Greece not to enforce the legal 
decision of its courts’.49 The question of war compensation pops up in numerous Greek 
editorials. In a controversial July 2012 issue of the Greek left-wing magazine Crash, journalists 
placed a photo of the German Chancellor in orange prison uniform (à la Guantanamo) on the 
cover. Crash suggested sending Merkel to the International Criminal Court on charges of crimes 
against humanity (arguing that the Chancellor has ‘made Greece a modern concentration camp, 
                                                            
46 Bild October 2010; FAZ April 2010. 
47 Other European countries have also dusted off their Nazi imagery during the euro crisis, including Cyprus (which was 
spared from German occupation), Spain and Italy. 
48 Lynn 2010: 5. 
49 Kathimerini 2010 
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in which the Greeks were isolated like lepers’.50 With this labeling of Germany as oppressor, 
Greece becomes an innocent victim. 
Yet the Greek (historical) subordination to German occupation and later dictatorship is not just a 
story of victimhood. It is also a story of humiliation and self-blame. As the anthropologist Michael 
Herzfeld notes, the Greek capacity for self-criticism is also ‘an expression of political subordination, 
when some Greeks ‘accepted’ the military junta of 1967-1974 on the grounds that they ‘needed’ 
discipline or bowed before repeated Nazi claims that they were ‘degenerate‘.51 This Greek narrative 
of subordination and need for external discipline generates a sense of shame, but it also paves the 
way for a possible active role: that of resistance. The newspaper To Vima quotes Navy reservist 
Giorgos Drakopoulos, ‘All the Greek people must rally together to rid the country of all those who 
oppress and humiliate us’.52 This trope is present in the streets of Athens with demonstrators 
holding banners saying ‘Don't buy German products, resistance against fourth Reich’ and the Greek 
unions have big banners saying 'Merkel Raus!' (Merkel Out!). The idea of collective self-defense is 
seen as loyalty or bravery from the underdog’s point of view.     
The Greek image of Germany as a (neo-)Nazi oppressor is ambiguous and contested. Greek 
editorials are keenly aware of the sense of shame and guilt that German leaders carry with them. 
Kathimerini reports that this means that, ‘the country, plunged into its guilt, is trying with agony to 
prove that all her actions are necessitated out of pure idealism’. According to this reading, Germany 
necessarily tries to mask its dominance as a form of ‘euro-nationalism’. Interestingly, several Greek 
newspapers embrace and quote sociologist Ulrich Beck’s criticism of German economic dominance. 
                                                            
50 Crash only appeared around that period and was highly marketed. Then the printed version stopped and now it is 
online only and it is not widely circulated. 
51 Hertzfeld 1987, 36. 
52 To Vima, Ref 
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While Merkel has never spoken up against the Nazi references in accordance with German 
stigma acceptance,53 some German media have objected to the Greek accusations. On 10 October 
2012, the BILD front cover reacted directly to the Greek criticism of Germany with the heading: 
‘Germany hasn’t deserved this’. German tabloid newspapers picked up the use of Nazi symbols in 
Greek protests and were appalled. One cover reads ‘the Greeks shames Europe… and still gets new 
millions’. 
Related to the Nazi trope is the notion of ‘colony’. Demonstrators in Athens use banners reading 
‘Merkel out, Greece is not your colony’ and ‘This is not a European Union, it’s slavery’. The image 
of a colony is repeated in many editorials of Kathimerini, seeing the bailouts as colonial strategies. 
Interestingly, the colonial metaphor became almost literal in German press, when in October 2010, 
BILD controversially suggested that Germany or German citizens bought Greek islands as a 
compensation for the bailout. The heading read ‘DIE REGIERUNG IN ATHEN WILL JETZT 
KRÄFTIG SPAREN – ABER WAS, WENN DAS NICHT REICHT? Verkauft doch eure Inseln, ihr Pleite-
Griechen ... und die Akropolis gleich mit!’54, suggesting Germans should simply buy Greek islands and the 
Acropolis from the ‘bankrupt-Greeks’. The tabloid quotes CDU leader Josef Schlarmann for saying: 
‘Greece owns buildings, companies and uninhabited islands that can be used for debt repayment’.  
Yet, far from all German newspapers rallied behind this proposal. German journalists are carefully 
watched by the rest of the world and by their each other in the ongoing self-reflexive debates about 
Germany’s position in Europe.55 For many Germans, upholding credibility after the atrocities 
committed during the Nazi regime still requires that Germany must live up to the highest moral 
standards and even outperform them, this does not involve colonizing or buying up Greek islands. 
 
                                                            
53 See also Jackson 2010; Adler-Nissen 2014. 
54 Bild, Ref. 
55 Adler-Nissen 2014 
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The complexities of Golden Dawn  
The reference to Nazism in the euro crisis comes full circle with the neo-Nazism of the Golden 
Dawn movement, which received 6,3 pct. of the votes at the general elections in Greece in January 
2015. Golden Dawn is staunchly eurosceptic, opposing Greece’s participation in the EU and the 
Eurozone. Its members are frequently responsible for anti-Semitic graffiti and their logo resembles a 
swastika. Officially denying that it has any connection to neo-Nazism, even though it openly admits 
heiling and selling WWII Nazi propaganda at rallies, the party admires Ioannis Metaxas, the Greek 
general who established the fascist dictatorship between 1936 and 1941.56 Ilias Kasidiaris, a 
spokesman for Golden Dawn, wrote an article that was published in a Golden Dawn magazine on 
20 April 2011, in which he said: 
What would the future of Europe and the whole modern world be like if World War II 
hadn't stopped the renewing route of National Socialism? Certainly, fundamental 
values, which mainly derive from ancient Greek culture, would be dominant in every 
state and would define the fate of peoples. Romanticism as a spiritual movement and 
classicism would prevail against the decadent subculture that corroded the white man. 
Extreme materialism would have been discarded, giving its place to spiritual 
exaltation’.57 
In the same article, Adolf Hitler is characterized as a ‘great social reformer’ and ‘military 
genius’. According to  Greek cultural theorist Paul Cartledge (1994), this return to classical 
heritage (combined with references to Nazi myths) can be interpreted in part as a take-over 
from the West’s desire for the modern Greeks to live up to their ancestors supposedly glorious 
past. Greek antiquity as a form of supreme society is in this sense constituted as a ‘huge 
                                                            
56 Ellinas 2013. 
57 ''Ο Κασιδιάρης εξυμνεί τον Χίτλερ, 17 September 2012''‘. Tvxs.gr. 2013-06-20, author’s translation. 
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burden’ on Greek self-understanding.58 This combination of Nazi-era rhetoric to spite a 
German politician does lend itself to a perverted sense of irony. It underscores anthropologist 
Michael Hertzfeld’s point that German Nazi propaganda on the one hand condemned 
modern Greeks as fit for only ‘servitude and death’, and on the other hand insisted that 
‘present-day Germans and the ancient Greeks [are] the twin pillars of the Aryan race’.59 
The usages of Nazi regalia in demonstrations in Greek cities and the rise of the extreme right 
and left has given rise to much self-reflection in Greek newspapers about how the rest of Europe 
and in particular Germany views Greece. When polls showed that Syriza was not on the rise in 
2010, one editor concluded: 
The news is better. First: we are no more the only black sheep in the white European 
herd… the polls show that the Greek public opinion is not only neo-fascists who want to 
burn the parliament but also people who think.60 
With Syriza now in power, this ‘black sheep’ image has become stronger in the Greek discourse, 
further strengthening an obsession with status, hierarchy and resistance of international shaming.  
 
Subordination: Negotiating victimhood 
 The most predominant image of Greece in German newspapers is that of the ‘liar’, ‘cheater’ 
and ‘sinner’. These labels are linked to crime, decadence and lost virtues. These labels refer 
explicitly or implicitly to a better Antiquity where Greece was a ‘superior civilization’. From this 
perspective, Germany is ‘naïve’ to support the Greeks. For the German tabloid BILD, the bail-
outs (which are in fact mostly guarantees rather than transfer of funds) is called ‘Griechenlandhilfe’. 
                                                            
58 Cartledge 1994, 4. 
59 Hertzfeld 1987, 66. 
60 To Vima 2010. 
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BILD adopts the perspective of the ‘ordinary German tax-payer’ at the bottom of German 
society. Accordingly, Germany becomes the victim of a ‘careless’ and ‘selfish’ Greek society that 
drains the pockets of German tax-payers. One BILD headline reads ’Bundies gegen Lüge’ (Alliance 
against lies) and argues that journalists must now pose uncomfortable questions and ‘dig out the 
truth’. Bild continues, ‘they must ask why Greek tricked the EU and falsified statistics and say 
stop’.61  
Falsified statistics refer to the time when the euro was launched in 1999. Italy was allowed in, 
despite doubts about whether it was ready. Greece was turned down because of the budget 
deficit and outstanding debts in a crushing blow for the political and economic establishment in 
Athens. By fiddling with the debt and deficit numbers, the Greek government later managed to 
convince the other EU members to allow Greece to join the Eurozone in 2001, signaling a 
landmark moment in the national aim to ‘increase our standard of living’ and ‘bolster our 
national self-confidence’, ‘based more on knowledge and modern structures’ as Minister of 
Economy and Finance Yiannos Papantoniou explained.62  
While he secured Greece membership of the Eurozone, Papantoniou did not manage to 
convince the rest of Europe that Greece had modernized and become a well-behaving member 
state. In November 2010, the German magazine Focus released a front page with Aphrodite 
showing the middle finger and the headline ‘Swindlers in the euro family’. The Focus cover was 
picked up by many Greek newspapers. In an instance of self-bashing, the Greek journalist 
cultivates the ‘nasty’ comments in the German press, arguing that German press has demonized 
Greece, making the crisis worse. As one editorial puts it ‘The riots in the streets and the bad press 
is driving away tourists, we are not doing enough to attract FDI and to privatize’.63 
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An interesting comparison is how Germany view Ireland, another of the PIIGS.64 Ireland has 
been playing the ‘good pupil’ card in relation to developments in Greece. This has led Angela 
Merkel to urge the Greeks to follow the Irish example65. Also within Ireland, the hierarchy looks 
different. In terms of the causes of the crisis, the Irish have their own moral version of the 
immaturity thesis, as Power and Nussbaum highlight: ‘Several people we spoke to believe that 
the Irish public acknowledges they are partly responsible for their own misfortune and are 
prepared to reap what they sowed.’66 German public debate considers the PIIG countries quite 
differently. A 2014 poll in Germany showed that 60 pct. of those interviewed believe that Ireland 
‘took austerity lying down’.67 This is not the case for Greece. 
 
Greek tragedy 
A second and related image is that of the Greek tragedy, which suggests that the Greek suffering 
is inevitable and that there is little that Greece or any other state can do about it. The sense of 
tragedy has also been reflected in situations of tension between Athens and Berlin. For instance, 
Greek President Carolas Papoulias accused German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble of 
insulting the country by likening Greece to a ‘bottomless pit’ (later Schäuble refrained from using 
the terms, but it was repeated by German media and German government members). As one 
German journalist writes: ‘The terrible scenes of Greece make us all deeply affected. But they 
should not lead to hasty relief efforts […] Where are the billions going anyway?’. The tragedy 
trope leads to the conclusion in several German newspapers in 2010 (repeated in May 2012 on 
the front page of Der Spiegel) that the Greeks must inevitably leave the Eurozone. ‘Grexit’ became 
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a common term and with that the idea that Greece had tricked itself into an exclusive club to 
which it did not belong and inevitably would have to leave. 
Interestingly, several Greek editorials re-circulate this idea of an inevitable tragedy, which 
reduces the complexities of the euro crisis to a Greek problem. As one editorial in To Vima reads: 
‘We are not serious: we are not willing to work to get out of the mess where we led ourselves, acting 
immaturely’. Interestingly, the editorial adds: ‘This is impossible to change’. In addition, Greek 
reports of its ‘brain drain’ of university educated young generations are often mentioned in To Vima, 
which concludes one of its editorials (without detectable irony!) that ‘We need for Germany, France 
and UK to create a sort of economic directorship for Europe’. As Hertzfeld notes, quoting Mosse, 
‘even the most articulate members of an oppressed population may strategically adopt the negative 
features attributed to it by those of higher status’.68 This self-bashing by Greek opinion-makers 
amounts to more than adapting to the practical realities of discrimination, it actively contributes to 
the subordination. 
 
Immature pupil  
A third and related figure in both Greek and German newspapers is that of Greece as the 
immature pupil (with Germany cast as teacher). This label is related to the tragedy image, but it 
differs because it offers the possibility of change and improvement of position.69 As with the other 
labels, the ‘underdog vs. modernity’ debate has a long history in Greek society. The self-labeling as 
‘immature’ in Greece pre-dates the euro – and has an important relationship with a perception of 
not being ‘modern’, which is arguably synonymous with not being Western European enough. As 
one Greek editorial notes in 2010, ‘it is no wonder that we will be thrown out of the Eurozone: we 
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are backwards, our technological development is low, and we have a middle class with no interests 
besides consumption’.70 In terms of understanding the production of hierarchy, it raises a number of 
questions. Is there a ‘hegemonic’ notion of European modernity acting as a yardstick against which 
PIIGS come up short in their own (and others) estimations? How did that emerge? How is it 
reproduced or changed in the euro crisis? 
There are plenty of ‘tailored’ diagnoses of immaturity for Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy (the 
PIIGS). The specifics are different, but the dominant narratives of what went wrong in these 
countries comes down to similar immaturity of political and economic governance that Greece is 
castigated for.71 However, where Greece sees itself (and is seen) as the worst of the ‘PIIGS’, and 
lowest in the ranking of Eurozone members, Italians perceive that their relegation to second-class 
status – compared to the first class status enjoyed by Germany, France and the United Kingdom – is 
unjust. Associate evaluation matters for how states manage their relationship to other states. 
Germany’s role of teacher is uncomfortable in an interstate relationship in Europe, which is 
supposed to be based on equality and reciprocity. The perception of this role in Germany is far 
from homogeneous. Responding to the harsh criticism of Germany in Greek media, the German 
government organized an official six-hour state visit in 2012 where the German Chancellor met 
with Greek Prime Minster Samaras. In preparation of the visit, Samaras explained: ‘We will receive 
her as befits the leader of a great power and a friendly country,’ he said. ‘People know that this 
government means Greece's last chance. We will make it. If we fail, chaos awaits us.’72. Samaras 
made an ambiguous statement: to be a ‘great power’ and a ‘friend’ are two different things and the 
ambiguity is also reflected in Merkel’s statements. 
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Keenly aware of the importance of symbolic gestures, Chancellor Merkel arrived in Athens in 
2012 with the state plane flying the flags of Greece and Germany. The gesture set a tone of 
humility from the German camp. Merkel herself is very aware of the importance of renegotiating 
(or concealing) the hierarchy between the two states: ‘I have not come as a taskmaster […] And 
nor have I come as a teacher to give grades, I have come as a friend to listen and be informed.’73 
However, the subsequent remarks confirm the role of the teacher as Merkel began to evaluate 
the Greek reform efforts: 
I come from East Germany and I know how long it takes to build reform […] The road 
for the people of Greece is very tough, very difficult, but they have put a good bit of the 
path behind them. I want to say you are making progress! 
Interestingly, Prime Minister Samaras contributed to the role-play. Greek officials underlined that 
Samaras was indeed a good pupil: ‘Samaras showed a real will to change things’, as one Greek 
government official says to German newspapers. 'He stressed what Greece had to do, not what 
others had to do for Greece.' In addition, the German officials respond by confirming this role: 'In 
our view Samaras is really trying to get things done,’ one German official said, requesting 
anonymity. 'Nobody should see this trip as a sign that all is perfect. But we recognize things are 
moving in the right direction.'74 
Yet the awkwardness of Greece’s relationship with Germany was on display during the visit 
where Samaras stressed: ‘Greeks are a proud people [and] our enemy is recession. But we are 
not asking for favors. In my discussion with the German chancellor I pointed out, however, that 
the Greek people are bleeding’.75 This suggests that rather than being the pupil ‘making 
progress’, Greece is a strong and full-grown nation, suffering from the recession. Interestingly, 
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the principle of equality of opportunity is stressed in the ‘we are not asking for favors’ remark. 
On the one hand, Samaras insists on taking on the responsibility for resolving the crisis, 
suggesting equality between Greece and Germany, and on the other hand, he suggests that the 
crisis is more structural, putting Greece to its knees. 
  
Conclusion  
This chapter has argued that neither an institutional nor or a structural understanding of hierarchy 
can explain the position of Germany and Greece in the Eurozone. The two understandings of 
hierarchy need to be combined and complemented with an analysis of national identity. This is 
because the euro crisis is not only about the skewed architecture of Economic and Monetary Union 
or failed national policies. It is also struggle over the sense of national self. Moreover, hierarchies 
(both when they appear as formal institutions and as broader societal discourses) are interpreted and 
reacted upon. Examining Greek and German debates about the each other’s role in the euro crisis, 
this chapter has demonstrated how the crisis strengthens self-reflexive and highly interactive debates 
on national identities, self-blame and self-stereotyping. This interactive dynamic means that both 
Greece and Germany can appear as innocent victims (the Greek oppressed and colonized victim, 
the naïve German tax-payer) that suffer from the other’s brutality (Nazism) or laziness (decadence). 
Tropes of Nazism in both German and Greek versions, criminality and colonialism are invoked as 
the Eurozone members are forced to interact more closely as the euro crisis; enforcing both a sense 
of common destiny and creating ideological and political divides. This results in complex political 
struggles that often collides nations with their leaders or with particular groups. 
There are important tensions between ideas of state sovereignty (equality) and principles and 
practices of rankings of states (hierarchy). On the one hand, international organizations such as the 
EU guarantee all member states the same status and obligations (formal equality of all Eurozone 
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states and their equal obligations in economic and monetary politics under EU law). On the other 
hand, international law and multilateral governance pave the way for organized inequality through 
rankings of national performances. These institutional rankings have implications not just for 
economic policies, unemployment rates and domestic social unrest, but also for structural and more 
encompassing classification of states and national identities. Within the EU system of formal 
equality, an institutional hierarchy is reinforced by mutual stereotyping and moral shaming. The 
German Chancellor’s delicate balancing acts during state visits to Athens indicate the difficulty of 
negotiating such hierarchical position in a discourse of equality. 
 Mediatized labels and stereotypes suggest particular positions for states and make different kinds 
of political decisions possible. Depending on whether Greece is a bottomless pit or a spoiled pupil in 
need of more discipline, it will need to act differently. Likewise it makes a difference for German 
strategy whether German economic dominance is labeled ‘strict’, ‘oppressive’ or downright 
‘hysteric’ by Greek and German newspapers. The classifications of states in the euro crisis are 
volatile and ambiguous, making alternative political choices not only possible, but also more likely. 
Hierarchies can involve a high degree of self-reproach, irony and – more generally – a heightened 
self-consciousness. States can seek to resist domination or to move up in the hierarchy, but in doing 
so they often end up expressing complicity with the very same order they seek to resist. In this sense, 
Greece is complicit in its own relegation to the bottom of the hierarchy. This complicity, however, 
also means that there are possibilities of change from within and below in the hierarchy. This raises 
all sorts of interesting questions: are all states equally concerned about how they are viewed by 
others? Or are Germany and Greece more concerned about their international ranking than other 
states? If so, is this linked to their history and to their common fate and obligations in the euro crisis? 
More broadly, does the European project, rather than ensuring sovereign equality, strengthen 
hierarchy and thereby national shame? Answering these questions will require addressing how 
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institutional and structural hierarchies interact – and how reflective practices contribute to the 
evolution, transformation and sometimes undermining of these hierarchies. Such practices are 
deeply political and while their consequences are far from automatic, they show a pattern. This is, 
ultimately, the key added insight of focusing on the social production of international hierarchy and 
the interactions within it. 
 
